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"That puzleing Problem":
Isaac Newton and the Political Physiology of Self
ROB ILIFFE*
Where religions once demanded the sacrifice of bodies, knowledge now calls for experimentation
on ourselves, calls us to the sacrifice ofthe subject ofknowledge.1
In the past few years, historians have developed a series of new techniques for
recovering the practices and contexts in which people understood the relations between
mind and body. From the recognition that modem compartmentalizations do not
correspond to earlier accounts ofthis link, and are thus inadequate as abasis forhistorical
research, a new "material-social" account of the mind-body relationship has emerged.
This approach embraces a multiplicity of discourses about the causes of behaviour and
disease, including commonplace tropes associated with social identities, humoral
pathology, andthe interplay between vulgarandelite accounts ofindividual responsibility.
It has proved possible to link these histories to contemporary physiologies and the often
complex accounts ofthe "wiring" which linked the soul's place in the brain to the rest of
the body.2
In the early modem period, the mind-body connection was continuously resubjected to
a series of mappings, and experts recognized that this relationship was one of mutual
causation. A physician like Richard Napier, for example, would have at his disposal a
wide range of sources such as astrology and Burton's Anatomy ofmelancholy to explain
the bodily origins of deviant behaviour. The defects of the body, such as the role of the
humoral balance, ofdreams, or ofthe passions, might be contrasted in a particular setting
with thepossibility ofdivine inspiration, ofdemonic possession or subversive enthusiasm,
and any one of these causes might retrospectively appear to have been complicit in the
formation of a malady. With such a variety of different resources, there was no obvious
"progressive" move in the medical sphere away from a humoral conception ofthe person
towards a radical dualism, and, as Brown has pointed out, physicians like Jerome Glaub
who remained loyal to Descartes in the eighteenth century "continued nevertheless to
adhere firmly to the neoclassical notions ofpsychosomatic interaction". Nor does dualism
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remotely capture the sophisticated interactions between soul and body postulated by
Descartes himself. In an important sense, the soul-its location and its function as the
active and moral essence ofthe individual- should be seen as the product ofthis forensic
and physiological knowledge.3
Non-mental explanations for behaviours were transformed by the new anatomy of the
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the causes of a number of disorders were
re-routed up towards the brain. Nevertheless, the fact that the mind could very easily have
deleterious effects on the body remained acommonplace with as much anecdotal evidence
as the corporeal aetiology of mental disease. The philosophical analysis of the workings
of the soul was traditionally part of the domain of natural philosophy, and in this system
it was generally held to be composed oftwo parts, the organic and the intellectual. Unlike
the functioning ofthe intellect and the will, the operations ofthe organic soul required the
physical organs and were concerned with vital operations in addition to those of
imagination and memory. Since (following Aristotle) most authors believed that sensation
was the basis ofcognition, it was held that there were a number of internal senses which
corresponded to the external sense organs and which were localizable in specific areas of
the brain. In the sixteenth century, theorists ofthe soul moved away from adhering rigidly
to faculty psychology and drew more and more from contemporary work in medicine,
though this was ofcourse still limited by theological doctrine.4
In the seventeenth century, anatomists and philosophers expressed arenewed interest in
locating the precise place ofthe soul. Notoriously, Descartes located it in the pineal gland,
but others, like Thomas Willis, disagreed. Willis, who remarked in his Cerebri anatome
thathe had "addicted [himself] to the opening ofheads especially", followed Gassendi and
divided the mind up into the rational soul and the animal or corporeal soul, allowing only
humans to have an immortal soul that could not be affected by disease or other external
problems. The corporeal soul, which humans shared with brutes, was composed ofthe so-
called vital soul (in theblood), and the sensitive soul (located in the nervous system). This
sensitive soul was closely linked to the rational soul, while the cerebral cortex served to
elaborate the animal spirits in the nervous system which were extracted from the most
subtle and active portions of the blood. The cortex was the seat of memory, while in
general the animal spirits were essential for memory and imagination:
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the Imagination is a certain undulation or wavering of the animal Spirits, begun more inwardly in
the middle of the Brain, and expended or stretched out from thence on every side towards its
circumference: on the contrary, the act ofthe Memory consists in the regurgitation or flowing back
ofthe Spirits from the exterior compass ofthe Brain towards its middle.
The rational soul was placed in the corpus callosum, seat of the "imagination" or
"phantasie", because "the Rational Soul depends very much, as to its operation, on the
Phantasie, without the help ofwhich, it can know or understand nothing".5
As Willis suggested, the role of the imagination (by the seventeenth century nearly
always identified with the fancy or phantasie) was centrally important in the healthy
working of the individual. Located by many writers along with common sense in the
anterior central ventricle, it was held to be the most powerful source ofahost ofmaladies
such as madness and melancholy. It was closely related to the passions, and worked by
reproducing images in the absence of those objects they represented. It could recombine
stored images and, when under the guidance of reason, worked so as to produce new
images. A number of traditions stressed the dangers of an ungoverned fancy. Ficino and
Paracelsus linked the imagination to magical medicine and in De virtute imaginativa
Paracelsus argued that "imagination can cause disease, can cause dreadful disease ... [it]
is more than nature and rules it". Bacon claimed that the restoration of man involved
"delivering and reducing" the mind from the deceptions of the imagination, while
contemporaries like Burton complained that the deluding imagination would constantly
"usurp no small authority to itself'.6
In the wake ofthe civil wars in England, the power ofthe imagination was invoked to
account for what many took to be the lawless fury of the radicals. One of the most
significant writers on this issue was Henry More, whose Enthusiasmus triumphatus of
1656 and Immortality ofthe soul of 1659 offered a mixture of evidence on the soul and
the imagination drawn from anecdotal, philosophical, medical and theological sources. In
the remainder of this paper, I look at More's work and then the use by Isaac Newton of
this material and ofother texts by authors such as Thomas Hobbes and Joseph Glanvill. I
look at how Newton maintained a practical and experimental interest in the problem of
self-movement throughout his career, aprojectwhich was sustainedby means ofanumber
ofmedical, alchemical and chemical researches. I conclude by looking at how he publicly
presented the experience offree will and self-motion as an undeniable fact which pointed
to the existence ofnon-mechanical laws ofnature.7
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1. The soul ofHenry More
In response to the descriptions ofthe soul in the writings ofa host of authors including
Descartes, Walter Charleton and Hobbes, Henry More published his Immortality ofthe
soul in 1659. He began from a series ofconsiderations about the state ofthe soul and the
experience of free will on the Hobbesian assumption that perception and consciousness
were nothing but "Corporeal Motion and Reaction", orconversely, that mattercould sense
or even think. If there were nothing but matter in the world, then of course Hobbes was
correct, but this could not explain phenomena such as the sense one has of being free to
move one's own body, or the well-attested capacity of a woman's imagination to work on
her embryo. Moreover, we appeared to have an awareness ofan internal power "to cleave
to that which is virtuous and honest, or to yield to pleasures, or other vile advantages".
More reconciled one's sense of freedom with Divine omniscience by remarking that
although we had a faculty of free will, the soul was "not alwaies in a state of acting
according to it". It could be "Heroically Good"-"though that happen in very few"-or
degenerate to the extent that "it may be as certainly known what she will doe upon this or
that occasion, as what an hungry Dog will doe when a crust is offered him". This was "the
generall condition of almost all men in most occurrencies oftheir lives".8
If all we were was simply matter in motion, then, More proceeded to prove, "the seat
of common sense" or Common Sensorium was neither the whole body, the orifice of the
stomach, the heart, the brain, the septum lucidum nor the conarion [i.e. the pineal gland].
Ifthe soul was in the body, then (contra Hobbes) it must indeedbe in thehead, as anumber
of experiments showed:
I have seen with mine own eyes a Frog quite exenterated, heart, stomack, guts and all taken outby an
ingenious friend of mine, and dextrous Anatomist, after which the Frog could see, and would avoid
any object in its way, and skipped as nimbly and freely up and down, as when it was entire, and that
for a great while. But a very little wound in the Headdeprives them immediately ofLife and Motion.
Whence it is plain that the derivation ofSense and Spontaneous Motion is not from the Heart.
Moreover, when nerves were ligated, one had feeling on the head's side ofthe binding but
not on the other, while in the cases of diseases which "deprave a mans Imagination and
Judgement; Physitians alwaies conclude something amiss within the Cranium".9
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Within the brain, a number of different sites were possible for the location of the soul.
Although Descartes' notion of the conarion as the seat of the soul had been subjected to
intense criticism, More defended its plausibility. While the nerves which met at the
beginning ofthe spinal marrow appeared to be a much more noble place for the soul than
the conarion, in fact when the nerves got into the brain, "they are devoid ofTunicles, and
be so soft and spongy, that the motion ofthe Spirits can play through them, and therefore
... they might ray through the sides, and so continue their motion to the Conarion . . .".
Nevertheless, the conarion appeared to be a region which housed a number of "stones",
and More admitted that it was "environ'd with a net of veines and arteries which are
indications that it is a part assigned for some more inferiour office". This being so, the
most likely place for the soul was in the animal spirits in the so called "fourth ventricle"
ofthe brain.10
In this ventricle, the "thinner matter" which was termed the "animal spirits" was found
in its "greatest purity and plenty", and even those who had followed Hippocrates in
placing the common sensorium in the heart had done so because they believed that its left
ventricle "was the fountain ofthese pure and subtile spirits . . .". The significance ofthese
spiritous entities was confirmed by an "ocular demonstration" of Henricus Regius which
More took to be "both ingenious and solid". This involved the observation of a shell-less
snail which was moving in a glass:
so soon as she begins to creep, certain Bubbles are discovered to move from hertail to herhead; but
so soon as she ceases moving, those Bubbles cease. Whence he concludes, That a gale ofspirits that
circuit from her head along her back to her tail, and thence along her belly to her head again, is the
cause ofher progressive motion.
The spirits were the "immediate instruments of sense and motion", as well being the chief
organs ofsight. This was clearfrom the fact that "dimness ofsight comes from deficiency
of these spirits . . ." and the common experience that when one's leg reawakens having
"gone to sleep", one "may plainly feel something creep into it tingling and stinging like
Pismires ... which can be nothing but the Spirits forcing their passage into the part". In
the light ofthese considerations he concluded that the function ofthe brain and nerves was
to "keep these subtile Spirits from over speedy dissipation".1
There were significant objections to this conception which More fended off with
customary braggadocio. Some had argued that the nerves contained a "milky whitejuice"
and were unsuitable for the passage ofthe spirits, while others maintained that the brain's
ventricles were too big for the purpose given them by More and were intended only for
"receptacles and conveyances of such excrementitious Humours which the Brain
discharges itself of'. Furthermore, if these spirits were the means by which spontaneous
motion were achieved, then "it could neverbe so sudden as it is, for we can wag ourfinger
as quick as thoughts, but corporeal motion cannot be so swift". More replied that the
nerves had to be porous, allowing for the easy passage of these spirits, for how otherwise
did they derive their juice? The motion was instantaneous because it took place by
pressure, just like sunlight does "through the aetherial Matter betwixt". Finally, whether
or not the brain had the function assigned to them by his critics,
10 Ibid., pp. 195-6, 197. 1 Ibid., pp. 199-200, 203, 204-5, 207, 208.
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The Diastole ... ofthe Brain keeping time with the pulse ofthe Heart, is amanifest indication, what
a vehement steam of Spirits, by the direct and short passage of the Arteriae Carotides, are carried
thither. For if one part of the Blood be more fiery and subtill than another, it will be sure to reach
the Head.12
The soul was diffused throughout the body at its earliest stages of growth and indeed
supervised its development, while the movements ofthe heart and lungs were more than
mechanical and were carried out by means of a "plastick power". This pervasiveness of
the soul explained passions and "sympathies" and, whereas Descartes had used the
phenomenon of a man's involuntary winking at the shake ofanother's hand near his face
to argue for a purely corporeal reflex to all such situations, More argued that not all these
responses were mechanical. The soul operated in many ofthese responses such as that of
reacting to a terrifying monster: "it is the effect of her as she resides in the Heart and
Stomack, which sympathize with the horrid representation in the Common Sensorium".
This was put down to the "exquisite unity of the Soul with her self'. Likewise, vision
required the existence of a soul extended all the way from the sensorium to the eye, for
otherwise the colours of the things seen would be confounded and "the bigness of the
Object diminished". More explained this by pointing to the path that the inverted image
took from the retina to the optic nerve; without the presence ofthe soul to keep the initial
image intact, it would become confused en route by the "depainture of sundry colours"
already present on the retina.13
Having located the soul, it was possible to account forother bodily phenomena. It was
obvious, for example, that the imagination's seat ofaction was in the animal spirits in the
fourth ventricle. Following the analysis in his Enthusiasmus triumphatus of 1656, More
argued that the imagination-used in "Romantick Inventions, or such as accompany the
more severe Meditations and Disquisitions in Philosophy, or any other Intellectual
entertainments"-was aided by "fasting, fresh Aire, moderate Wine, and all things that
tend to an handsome supply and depuration of the Spirits .. ..". This was also the setting
for the exercise ofmemory, which could not be reduced to the physical transformation of
the brain in the shape ofthe things it represented. Again, animal spirits were essential for
the proper functioning of this faculty, which he re-examined in a section on the
preexistence ofsouls. Here herecounted ahostofexamples ofindividuals whose memory
had been blighted by disease and violence, such as MessalaCorvinus, who forgot his own
name, another, who lost "all his learning" by means of "a blow with a stone", and "a
young student ofMontpelier, [who] by a wound, lost his memory so, that he was fain to
be taught the letters ofthe Alphabet again".14
Animal spirits also explained spontaneous motion which was performed "by the
continuation of the Spirits from the seat of common sense to the Muscles, which is the
gross Engine of motion". The precise manner in which this took place, More continued,
12 Ibid., pp. 209-10, 211-14. For an account of 14 Ibid., pp. 228-9, 231-2, 255-6. There is a more
knowledge ofnerves in this period, see E Clarke, elaborate analysis ofimagination and its operation in
'The doctrine ofthe hollow nerve in the seventeenth the behaviour ofenthusiasts and atheists in
and eighteenth centuries', in L G Stevenson and R P Enthusiasmus triumphatus, which drew heavily from
Multhauf(eds), Medicine, science andculture, Fienus's De viribus imaginationis, and Burton's
Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1968, pp. 123-41. Anatomy ofmelancholy.
13 More, Immortality, op. cit., note 7 above, pp.
217-18, 219, 220, 223-4.
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"we partly feel and see; that is to say, we find in ourselves a power, at our own pleasure
to move this or the other member with very great force, and that the Muscle swells that
moves the part . . .". This clearly showed the "influx of Spirits, thither directed or there
guided by our meer will". It was the "vinous" animal spirits that swelled the muscles, and
More "look[ed] upon the Fibrous part of the Muscle as the main engine of motion". The
soul "moistens" these fibrous parts with "that subtle liquorofthe Animal Spirits", and this
makes them "swell and shrink, like Lute-strings in rainy weather". This was the main
cause ofthe "notable strength ofour Limbs in Spontaneous motion".15
Once this explanatory system was in place, there was no need to seek any further for
hypotheses. The fact that such spirits had been seen in the fibrous matter of the muscles
and the experience of our control over our own body was "sufficient to salve all
Phaenomena of this kind". Spontaneous motion happens because the soul is extended
throughout the body and thatpart ofitwhich is in the muscles "guides the Spirits into such
Pores and parts, as is most requisite for the shewing the use ofthis excellent Fabrick ...
by a power near a-kin to that by which she made the Body and the Organs thereof'. By
these means humans could walk and play music without thinking about the processes
involved.16
Medico-theological projects which aimed to tease out the home of the soul and which
claimed tobe able to explain the complexities ofmind-body interaction formed an integral
part of the work of early modem divines and natural philosophers. Within this genre,
More's books formed a particularly useful resource in the aftermath ofthe Restoration of
1660, since they pointed out how godly academics might steer a path between atheistic
and enthusiastic models ofthe action of the soul. One intellectual who swiftly picked up
More's approach as a basis for his own was Isaac Newton. More's system, and in
particular his view ofthe soul was not directly embraced by him although hedid succeed
in transforming More's approach into an experimental programme, and he took much of
the empirical evidence in The immortality ofthe soul at face value. In the next section I
look at how Newton created an experimental project aimed at elucidating the workings of
the soul from his reading of a series oftexts by More, Joseph Glanvill, Walter Charleton,
and Thomas Hobbes. In so doing, Newton was also concerned with avoiding the
deleterious theological and political consequences ofungodly accounts ofthe soul.
2. The Brain ofIsaac Newton
Although he is of course best known for his work in mathematics, optics and
mechanics, recent studies have suggested that alchemy and theology played central roles
in Newton's private intellectual life. Indeed, as his unpublished manuscripts have been
progressively examined from the 1950s to the present day, it has become increasingly
apparent that he does not wholly fit the Enlightenment depiction ofhim as the archetypal
rational mechanical philosopher. In the rest of this paper, I want to enhance the
unorthodox picture of his private concerns still further by showing that his attempts to
explain the action ofthe human soul upon the body formed a central interest from the very
beginning of his researches at Cambridge, right up to his battles with Gottfried Leibniz
15 More, Immortality, op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 16 Ibid., pp. 233, 234.
231-2, 255-6.
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nearly sixty years later. This project started as an attempt to determine the limits of
mechanical aspects of vision and the workings of memory and the imagination; later it
turned into a phenomenal truth according to which Newton asserted that the veryfact of
our capacity to move our own bodies-regardless of how this was accomplished-
demonstrated that there was a limit to mechanistic accounts ofthe workings ofthe world.
This did not mean that natural philosophy was incapable of determining how this
extraordinary facility was performed. Indeed, Newton was adamant that only a proper
understanding of this process could shed light on the relationship between God and his
creation.
In June 1691, he wrote a letter to John Locke thanking him for his attempt to use his
influence in procuring a place for Newton at the Mint and questioning Locke's
hermeneutic identification of Christ with the Ancient of Days. He went on to respond to
a question raised by Locke concerning an experiment in Boyle's Book ofColours which,
he admitted, "I once made upon my self with ye hazzard of my eyes". This involved
looking "a very little while upon ye sun in a looking glass wth my right eye", and then
looking at the colours of the impressions made when winking in the direction of a dark
corner of his chamber "to observe the impression made & the circles of colours wch
encompassed it & how they decayed by degrees & at last vanished". This was repeated
twice, after which he waited until "the phantasm of light & colours about it were almost
vanished", when
intending my phansy upon them to see their last appearance I found to my amazemt that they began
to return & by little & little to become as lively & vivid as when I had newly looked upon ye sun.
But when I ceased to intende my phansy upon them they vanished again.
After this, Newton found he could make the "phantasm" return, without looking at the
sun.17
In time, strange things happened. When he looked on a bright object, he "saw upon it a
round bright spot of light like ye sun". And so long as he "intended [his] phansy a little
while" upon bright objects, this "phansy" began to make an impression on his left eye as
well as his right, even though he had used only his right eye forthe experiment. Each time,
the effort required to do this was lessened, and soon Newton was unable to avoid seeing
the sun wherever he looked, so much so that he had to shut himself up in his "chamber
made dark for three days together & used all means to divert my imagination from ye
Sun". By remaining in the dark and "imploying [his] mind about otherthings" he was able
to use his eyes again, though for the next few months: "the spectrum ofthe sun began to
return as often as I began to meditate upon ye phaenomenon, even tho I lay in bed at
midnight with the curtains drawn". On top of this, he told Locke that he could probably
make the image reappear "by the power of my phansy". Having finished telling this tale,
he told Locke that the peculiar phenomenon related by Boyle, in which a man constantly
saw the "phantasm" of the sun in bright objects, probably involved a concurrence of the
man's "phansy" and the "impression made by ye sun's light":
17 Newton to Locke, 30 June 1691, in A R Hall, et same experiment was recounted to Conduitt in the
al. (eds), The correspondence ofIsaac Newton, 7 mid 1720s; cf. King's College, Cambridge, Keynes
vols, Cambridge University Press, 1959-81, vol. 3, Ms. 130 (15).
pp. 152-54, p. 153. Sixty years after the events, the
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and so yourquestion about ye cause ofthis phantasm involves anotheraboutye powerofphansy wch
I must confess is too hard a knot for me to untye. To place this effect in a constant motion is hard
because ye Sun ought then to appeare perpetually. It seems rather to consist in a disposition of ye
sensorium to move ye imagination strongly & to be easily moved both by ye imagination & by ye
light as often as bright objects are looked upon.18
Newton's problem involved the function and location ofthe soul, the sensorium and the
imagination, issues which captivated his interest right up to the end ofhis life and which
went back to some of the earliest researches of his student days. His early notebook
detailing these investigations constitutes an experimental programme based on carefully
chosen notes from a number of sources. The basis of this programme was the search for
the precise roles of the soul and the "outside" world in contributing to experience and
knowledge, and under a heading initially entitled 'Occult Qualityes' but then changed to
'Philosophy', he noted that the nature ofthings was "more securely and naturally deduced
from their operacouns one upon another yn upon or senses". When this was done by
experiments and "we have found ye Nature of Bodys, by ye latter we may more clearly
find the Nature of or senses". But as long as we "are ignorant of ye nature ofboth soule
and body, we cannot clearly distinguish how far an act ofsensation proceeds from ye soul
and how far from the body". Indeed, the last aspect ofthis formulation appeared to be the
goal ofNewton's researches. What was the moral and mental topology ofthe brain? What
powers did the soul possess?
To answer the topological issue, Newton read a number of different works, the most
significant ofwhich was More's The immortality ofthe soul. Information from More such
as "to them of Java Pepper is cold" (under the heading 'Of Sensation') helped him
formulate basic principles such as that "the senses of men are diversely affected by the
same objects according to the diversity of their constitution". More was a fund of other
material, such as ten possible sources for the location of the soul, and Newton drew
liberally from the wealth of anecdotal and empirical information in his book:
A frog's braine being peirced it looseth both sence and motion but it will leape and have its sence
though its bowells bee taken out. Phisitians find ye causes of lethargies Apoplexies Epilepsies &c
diseases yt seiz on ye Animall functions in ye head. Unles ye braine be peirced so deepe as to reach
ye ventricles ye wound will not take away sence & motion. A man cannot see through ye hole wch a
trepan makes in his head. Stones have beene found in ye glandula pinealis & it is invironed with a
net ofveines & arteries. A Vertigo must be from ye turning round ofye spirits. The least weight upon
a mans braine when hee is trepanned maketh him wholly devoyd of sensation & motion.19
From these examples it is clear that he was fascinated both by the different responses
ofmen to the same objects, and by the often negligible role ofthe soul in the performance
of bodily activity. In a note entitled 'Of Motion', for example, he took down Joseph
Glanvill's example of an artist who "plays a lesson not minding a stroke [and] sings
neither minding nor missing a note", and argued-again using data from The immortality
ofthe soul-that "the motion of ye stomack in vomitting (though wholly against our will
18 Hall, etal. (eds), op. cit., note 17 above, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 377, 383-4
pp. 153-4. (from CUL Add. Ms. 3996). I cite the transcriptions
19 J E McGuire and M Tamny (eds), Certain in this edition.
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and therefore merely mechanicall) by ye touch of a whalebone only", was a much better
demonstration that "6ye actions ofbrutes to be mechanicall & independent ofsoules, than
Chartes his instance ofye winking at ye shaking of a friends hand by ye eye". Continuing
this line of enquiry, he noted the passage from More on the visible causes of a snail's
motion, and compared this to a critique of a revolving wheel in Glanvill's Vanity of
dogmatizing.20
In spite ofthis appreciation ofthe possible significance ofmechanical motion in human
action, there was a vast realm ofbehaviour which could not be reduced to mechanism. In
a section entitled 'of ye soule', he followed More in rejecting Hobbes' materialism
although he concurred with the authorofDe corpore that "probablyye souleperceives noe
bodys but by ye helpe of their motion", Nevertheless (in an argument recollected in his
letter to Locke), he claimedthatthoughtcould notbereduced to matterin motion, because
then we would never be able to recall anything to memory. For "so long as yt action
continews we mustthinke of& rememberytphantasme", and notbefore that action ceases
can we stop thinking of it in order to remember it. But if the act of remembering is itself
merely matter in motion, "how shall we call this thing into memory ye action being done
& we haveing no principle wth in us to begin such a motion againe wthin us [?]" In the
light ofthese notes on Hobbes he then considered why it was that we perceived images to
be outside our bodies when they were actually experienced in the sensorium. Although
such operations took place somewhere in the brain, we did not see the brain "it not being
in motion, & probably ye soule perceives noe bodys but by ye helpe of their motion".
Images appear to be outside our bodies because "in ye image of things delineated in the
braine by sight, yebodysimage isplaced in ye midstofye images ofotherthings, is moved
at or command towars & from those other images".21
Such considerations privileged the "principle" within us which began motion and which
exercised control overtheposition ofthe body withrespectto the outside world. Inhisquest
for the seat of the soul-the place of this "principle"-Newton turned to the location of
imagination, and indeed his startling experiments on his own eyes were initially entered in
a section entitled 'Immagination. & Phantasie & invention.' Towards thisend, hetookdown
conventional lore surrounding the optimal body and control ofthe fancy for the scholar:
We can fancie ye thing wee see in aright posture wthye heeles upward. Phantasie is helped by good
aire fasting moderate wine but spoiled by sme drunkenesse. Gluttony, too much study, (whence &
from extreame passion cometh madnesse) dizzinesse, commotions ofye spirits. Meditation heates a
ye ew braine in some to distraction in others to an akeing & dizzinesse. The boyling blood ofyouth
puts ye spirits upon too much motion or else causet too many spirits, but could [i.e. old] age makes
ye brain either two dry to move roundly through or else is defective of spirits yet theire memory is
bad. A man by heitning his fansie & immagination may bind anothers to thinke what hee thinks as
in ye story ofye Oxford Scollar in Glanvill Van ofDogmatizing.22
20 Ibid., pp. 418-20. the scholar was melancholy, which if severe was
21 Ibid., pp. 448,450, 452. He dutifully noted the reckoned by contemporaries to be a species of
sections in The immortality ofthe soul which madness. See L Babb, The Elizabethan malady: a
pertained to the causes of memory loss in 'Of study ofmelancholiafrom 1580-1642, East Lansing,
Memory', ibid., pp. 392-4 (but cf. p. 450). Michigan State College Press, 1951, especially pp.
22 Ibid., pp. 394-6. Throughout, struckthrough 25-42, and MacDonald, op. cit., note 3 above, p. 28.
words indicate deletions. The occupational hazard of
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In the notebook, this section on the imagination continues with the report ofhis optical
self-experiment (although this was added some time later), but about the same time that
he was taking these notes (in mid 1664), he was already considering the extent to which
vision might be due to motion. Under the heading 'Of light', he suggested that "light
cannot be by pression, for yn wee should see in ye night a wel or better yn in ye day we
should se a bright light above us because we are pressed downwards" while "A man
goeing or running would see in ye night". Similarly, in 'Of Vision', he remarked that
relative permanency was required forperfect vision "thus acoale whirled round is not like
a coale but fiery circle". A Morean note on the role of spirits in the functioning ofvision
was followed by some physiological considerations about the capillaments of the optic
nerve, in order to explain why it was that we did not see two images. Again, his central
concern was the distinction between the mechanical and the voluntary movements of the
eye and the fancy. Some time later, he attempted to resolve these issues by means of a
series of eye experiments.23
The reports of these trials suddenly appeared in a section on the imagination and
fantasy. He remarked on how when he had finished looking at the sun, "I shfut my c-yes-&
them appemrd nzthing untill I str,ngA fai,ei,d .-O 4, .e,, -e_ all light couloured bodys
appeared red & darke coloured bodys appeared ed blew". When the motion of spirits in
his eye had almost "decayed", so that he "could see all things wth their natur colours", he
shut the eye again and "could see noe colour or image till I heightned my fantasie of
seeing 0. . .". The conclusion of this part of his investigation was that "I gather my
Phantasie & ye Ohad ye same operation uppon ye optic spirits in my optick nerve & yt ye
same motions are caused in my braines by both". He looked on some white paper and "by
means of a strong phantasie" saw a spot which was darker than the paper, and he saw the
same "phantasme" when looking at abright cloud until at last he was able to make the spot
glitter against the background ofa "dusky red (whither I look upon yepaper orcloude) like
ye Gin a cloud so bight my eys watered".24
Although-as he later confessed to Locke-this seriously damaged his eyes and
resulted in his confinement to bed for a number of days, this was not before the same
experiments had been rigorously retried: "Imploying my selfe in other exercises for two
or 3 howers ["an hower before 0sed [i.e. set] hee being wholly clouded" added] when I
thought my eye was prety well restored I repeated all ye former experiment". A slight
variation was that now when he looked at clouds with his good eye, "I could see ye 0
pictured on ye cloudes or other white objects almost as plaine as if I had looked wth my
distempered ey ye other being shut ["& every where about 0 appeared a dusky red &
blacknesse" added]". At the end of all this, his visual machinery was wrecked: "I made
such impress on ye optick nerve yt let me looke wth wch eye I would 0offered itself to my
vew unless I set my fantasie to work on other things wch wth much difficulty I could doe".
When the impress ofthe sun's image was not permanently in view, "I could easily imagine
severall shapes to be where I usually apprc as if I saw ym in ye 0 s place", from which
"perhaps may be gathered yt ye tenderest sight argues ye clearest fantasie of things visible
& hence something ofye nature ofmadnesse & dreames may be gathered". This last entry
23 McGuire and Tamny (eds), op. cit., note 19 24 Ibid., pp. 396, 442-4. 0 was conventional
above, pp. 380, 382, 386. shorthand for gold or (as in this case) the sun.
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shows how Newton's programme in these operations was premissed on the understanding
of an intimate connection between his optical work and the more general account of the
body's operations evidenced by his notes from More, Hobbes and Glanvill.25
Some time after these researches, he performed some of them again in an even more
radical manner. He put a bodkin between the eyeball and socket "as neare to ye backside
ofye eye as I could". A number ofcircles appeared ifhe continued to rub his eye with the
end ofthe bodkin, but the images grew fainter ifhe held his eye and the bodkin still and
they "would grow fainte & often disappeare untill I renewed ym by moving my eye or ye
bodkin". Perhaps, he suggested of another experiment in which a variegated series of
colours had appeared to the sight, ,ye spirits were strained out of ye Retina . . . or
otherways made incapable ofbeing acted upon by light & soe made a lesse appearance of
light yf ye rest ofye Retina".26
This was followed by an account of a dissection of an optic nerve. Newton argued that
each point in the retina of one eye had a corresponding point in the other eye, and from
these two points ran "two very slender pipes, filled wth a most lympid liquor ... wthout
either interruption or any other uneavenesse or irregularity". Thesejoined up on one side
of the brain "& there unite into one pipe as big as both of them, & so continue in one
passing ... into ye brain where they are terminated". This place was "perhaps at ye next
meeting of ye nerves twixt ye Cerebrum & cerebellum, in ye same order that their
extremitys were scituate in the Retinals". From these observations it was clear why two
retinal images made one image in the brain, and why two things could not appear in the
same place, namely because both could not "be carried onye samepipes ... intoyebraine,
thatwchis strongest ormosthelpedbyfantacy will thereprevaile andblot outthe other".27
In the place where information from both sides of the brain arrived at a contact point,
"by their extemall figure they seeme as if the capillamenta concentered like ye radij of a
hemisphere to a point in ye lower part ofthejuncture". This was the probable location of
the "visive faculty", for why otherwise "doe the nerves swell there to so great a bulke as
it were preparing for their last office . . ."? This was where the cerebral texture was the
finest, "in ye midst of the brain, constituting ye upper part of that small passage twixt all
25 Ibid., p. 444. Newton later took notes from
Boyle on "tender" sight and hearing; see CUL Add.
Ms. 3975 fol. 22. For the relationship between
sensitivity and madness, see G Speak, "'An odd kind
ofmelancholy": reflections on the glass delusion in
Europe (1440-1680)', Hist. Psychiatry, 1990, 1:
191-206, and for madness in general, see R Porter,
Mind-forg'd manacles: a history ofmadness in
Englandfrom the Restoration to the Regency,
London, Athlone Press 1987. In his graduate
notebook Newton set down some queries concerning
whether the soul, being seemingly able to remember
some dreams while one is awake, "be perpetually
employed in sleepe", and he went on to ask
accordingly if "dreames are ofye body or soule"; see
McGuire and Tamny, op. cit., note 19 above, p. 452.
26 CUL Add. Ms. 3975 fols 15-18, reproduced in
McGuire and Tamny, op. cit., note 19 above, pp.
482-8. For his early account ofthe dissection ofa
sheep's eyeball, see his 'Description ofthe optick
nerves and theirjuncture in the brain', printed in D
Brewster, Memoirs ofthe life, writings and
discoveries ofSir Isaac Newton, 2 vols, Edinburgh, T
Constable, 1855, vol. 1, pp. 432-6. On the
manuscript (CUL Add. Ms. 3970 fol. 650') Newton
noted: "I was prevented by an accident from taking
ye distance ofye Christalline Humor from ye Horny
Tunick wch I would gladly have done to have had ye
conformity ofall ye Parts one to another in one & the
same eye." For his views on this subject in the early
1680s see his letters to William Briggs in Hall, et al.,
op. cit., note 17 above, vol. 2, pp. 377-8, 381-5 and
417-19.
27 McGuire and Tamny, op. cit, note 19 above, pp.
484-6. For later use ofthis material in post-1706
drafts for the Opticks, see CUL Add. Ms. 3970 fol.
233r, and for the final version in the 1717/18 edition
see Opticks, reprint, New York, Dover, 1979,
pp. 346-7 and 353-4.
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ye ventricles". Light hit the retina and the vibration caused thereby produced a motion
which was either carried to the sensorium or produced other motions. Water was too
coarse a substance to carry this motion intact, while as for the putative role of animal
spirits in this process, "though I lyed a peice ofye optick nerve at one end & warmed it in
ye middle to see ifany aery substance by that meanes would disclose it selfe in bubbles at
the other end, I could not spy the least bubble; a little moisture only & ye marrow it selfe
squeezed out".28
There was no need to suppose the existence of such fine particles, a hypothesis which
in any case was liable to the problem that ifsuch matter could enter the pores ofthe brain
and nerves it "would be too subtil to bee imprisoned by ye dura mater & Skull". Such a
conjecture was redundant since
Motion is ever lost by communication especially twixt bodys of different constitutions: and
therefore it can noe way bee conveyed to ye sensorium so entirely as by the aether it selfe. Nay
granting mee but that there are pipes fill'd wth a pure transparent liquor passing from ye ey to ye
sensorium & ye vibrating motion ofye aetherwill ofnecessity run along thither ... yt motion cannot
stray through ye reflecting surfaces ofye pipe but must run along (like a sound in a trunk) intire to
ye sensorium.
This, Newton suggested, was "conformable to the sense of hearing wch is made by like
vibrations", while the whiteness of the brain and nerves implied extraordinarily slender
vessels. "Its pretty", he concluded, "to consider how these agree wth the utmost
distinctnesse in vision".29
3. Trepanning the aether
By the end of the 1660s, Newton had performed a number of dissections and related
experiments to divine for himself how information might travel to and from the brain by
means ofthe nerves and visual capillamenta. Implicit in this programme was a view ofthe
role ofthe imagination in producing vision, as well as an account ofthe way in which the
sensorium might control the motions of the muscles. His concern with this project
continued into the 1670s and was further explored with the tools which he was developing
in alchemy and which were related to biological issues. Betty Dobbs has recently argued
that in a brief series of alchemical propositions from about 1669 (Keynes Ms. 12A), he
was already showing his beliefin a living vegetable chemistry, while this is clearly visible
in two major writings of the early to mid 1670s. In the 1669 manuscript he spoke of a
vitalistic alchemical agent and "fermental virtue" or "magnesia" which "accommodates
itself to every nature. From metallic semen it generates gold, from human [semen] men
etc.". In a work from the early 1670s called 'OfNature's Obvious Laws and processes in
vegetation' he argued that the earth resembled "a great animall ["or rather inanimate
vegetable" added]", which "draws in aetheriall breath for its dayly refreshment and vital
ferment and transpires again wth gross exhalations". The aether was "probably a vehicle
to some more active spt. & ye bodys may bee concreted of both together", while "in ye
aether ye spt is intangled". This spirit was the "material soule of all matter" and "perhaps
28 McGuire and Tamny, op. cit., note 19 above, pp. 29 Ibid., pp. 488.
487-8.
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the body of light", on the grounds (amongst other things) that both "have a prodigious
active principle ["both are perpetuall workers" added]" and "heate exites light & light
exites heat, heat excites ye vegetable principle & that e*ei+es increaseth heat". Whatever
its precise nature, it was an aetherial agent which was the "only principle and ferment of
all vegetation" and
There is therefore besides ye sensible changes wrought in ye textures of ye grosser matter a more
subtile, secret & noble ehlange- wroetght ["way ofworking" added] in all vegetation which makes its
products distinct from all others & ye immeadiate seate of thes operations is not ye whole bulk of
matter, but rather an exceeding subtile & ["inimaginably" added] small portion of matter diffused
through the masse, wch ifit were seperated, there would remain but a dead & inactive earth.
He proposed to examine the union ofthe soul with the body by these means and it was not
long before his interest in life and self-motion was heard by a much wider audience.30
It became known to a small group of people in the mid 1670s that he had immersed
himself in these chemical pursuits, and John Collins told James Gregory in October 1675
that he had not seen Newton for nearly a year, "not troubling him as being intent upon
Chimicall Studies and practises, and both he and Dr Barrow &c beginning to thinke
mathcall Speculations to grow at least nice and dry, if not somewhat barren". 'OfNature's
Obvious Laws' was re-used for the alchemical portions of the 'Hypothesis' which he
composed in November and December 1675 as a hopeful means ofending disputes over
his notions of light and colours. In the version of this which he sent to Oldenburg on the
7 December, he inserted a number ofalchemical phrases. In the printed version, he argued
that Nature was perhaps composed of "nothing but various Contextures of some certaine
aetheriall Spirits or vapours condens'd as it were by praecipitation, much after the manner
that vapours are condensed into water or exhalations into grosser substances", although
this replaced a manuscript version in which he had stated that Nature "may be nothing but
aether condensed by a fermental principle". He cited electricity as an example which
demonstrated that "something of an aetheriall Nature" seemed to be condensed in bodies,
and in the initial version he argued that a similar aetherial spirit might be "condensed in
fermenting orburning bodies, or otherwise inspissated in ye pores ofye to a tender matter
wch may be as it were ye succus nutritious of ye earth or primary substance out of wch
things generable grow". In apassage retainedin the versionpublished in thePhilosophical
Transactions, he proposed that the Earth, ''wch may be evry where to the very centre in
perpetuall working, may continually condense so much of this Spirit as to cause it from
above to descend with great celerity for a supply".31
30 Smithsonian Institute, Dibner MSS. 103IB, fols The 'Hypothesis' is printed in ibid., vol. 1, pp.
3V and 5V, now printed in B J T Dobbs, The Janus 362-86 (cf. pp. 364-5). The version printed in
face ofgenius. The role ofalchemy in Newton's Thomas Birch's History ofthe Royal Society has
thought, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. been republished in I B Cohen (ed.), Isaac Newton's
256-70, pp. 264 and 269. Compare with CUL Add. letters andpapers on naturalphilosophy,
Ms. 3970 fol. 292r: "(once light) enters into the Cambridge, Mass., and London, Harvard University
composition of all bodies, why may it not be the Press, 1978, pp. 177-235. The remarks about
chiefprinciple ofactivity in them?" Cf. also Dobbs, condensed aetherial spirits are lifted from a
op. cit., pp. 14, 24-5. significant passage in 'OfNature's Obvious Laws ...'
31 Collins to Gregory, 19 October 1675, in Hall, et fol. 3V; cf. Dobbs, op.-cit., note 30 above, pp. 100-2
al., op. cit., note 17 above, vol. 1, pp. 355-6, p. 356. and 265.
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Describing nature as a "perpetuall circulatory worker", he argued that like air the aether
was much rarer in "the pores ofchrystal, glass, water, and other Naturall bodyes" than in
"free aethereall Spaces, & at so much a greater degree of rarity as the pores of the body
are Smaller". From this it may be, "that Spirit ofWine, for instance, though a lighterbody,
yet haveing Subtiler parts & consequently Smaller pores then water, is the more Strongly
refracting liquor". To an earlier draft ofthis paperhe added along section on the principles
underlying self-motion, maintaining that a difference in density between the aethers
outside and inside the body's muscles might explain what he called "that puzleing
Problem"; namely "by what means the Muscles are contracted and dilated to cause
Animal motion". He hoped that this could "receive greater Light from hence then from
any other means men have hitherto been thinking on". For example, if a man could
"condense & dilate at will the aether that pervades the muscle; that condensation or
dilatation must vary the compression ofthe Muscle, made by the Ambient aether, & cause
it to Swell or Shrinck accordingly". Water could not easily be compressed, but Spirit of
Wine and Oil could, and he suggested that Boyle's experiment of "a Tadpole Shrinking
very much by hard compressing the water in wch it Swam, is an Argument that Animal
juices doe the same". Hence the aether in a muscle would swell or shrink according to its
relative density to the ambient aether.32
The question of how muscles acted in various states had very recently been the focus
of renewed attention by scholars such as Nicolaus Steno, Richard Lower and more
particularly Thomas Willis and John Mayow. Willis outlined an account of muscular
contraction using chemical principles in his Cerebri anatome of 1664 and in his
Pathologiae cerebri of 1667. In 1664 he argued that contraction occurred when animal
spirits from the nerves met up with "saline-sulphureous" particles from the arterial blood,
whereupon the "copula" formed by the union of the two would break and give rise to an
"explosion" when stimulated by the nerves. In Pathologiae cerebri, this explanatory
system changed so that the explosive nature of muscular action was caused by a meeting
of "spirituo-saline" particles from the nerves and "nitro-sulphurous" particles from the
blood. In his Tractatus duo of 1668, Willis's student Mayow argued against this that
Willis's theory implied that the two different kinds ofparticles had at some previous stage
been conjoined in the brain-in which case why would the chemical explosion nothappen
there? Rather, Mayow developed his account of aerial nitre to suggest that "nitro-saline"
particles travelled in the arterial blood to the muscles where they remained. Animal spirits
produced in the brain were dispersed to the muscles by means of the nerves, and after
contact between them an explosion and hence muscular contraction occurred.33
In 1670, Willis published a response to Nathaniel Highmore's treatise on hysteria and
hypochondria to which he appended two tracts, one ofwhich was a further assessment of
32 Hall, et al., op. cit., note 17 above, vol. 1, pp. 33 Wllis,op. cit., note 5 above, and idem, Pathologiae
366-7. In the original autograph (CUL Add. Ms. cerebri etnervosigenerisspecimen, London, 1667; J
3970 fols 538r-547r) the section on self-motion is Mayow, Tractatus duo. Quorwn prioragitde
taken from another source and starts on a separate respiratione: alterde rachitide, Oxford, 1668. My
sheet; see ibid., fols 540W-5411. Boyle's experiments, account is based on R Frank Harveyandthe Oxford
actually carried out between August 1662 and May physiologists. Scientific ideasandsocial interaction,
1663, were initially published in 'New pneumatical London, University ofCalifornia Press, 1980, pp. 222-3
experiments concerning respiration', Philosophical and 230-4, and M A Nayler, 'The insoluble problem:
Transactions, 1670, 5: 2011-31 and 2035-56 muscle in the mid to late seventeenth century', PhD
(especially 2041-3). thesis, University ofMelbourne, 1993, pp. 335-452.
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the causes ofmuscular motion. Incorporating Steno's recent workon muscle structure into
his hypothesis, Willis now paid more attention to the question of how the "tender and
immoveable Brain" could bring about muscular contraction by means of the "small and
fragile nerves". Since such a situation could not be effected by the brain alone, the cause
ofviolent contraction had to lie in the explosive potential ofa meeting between the animal
spirits supplied to the tendons or in the muscle itself, and a subtle sulphureous or nitrous
liquor derived from the blood. The precise mechanism by which the brain regulated the
flow of animal spirits in and out of the tendons was complicated in Willis's scheme,
although it was this feature that controlled the extent of contraction. Finally, in the fourth
book of Mayow's Tractatus quinque of 1674 (De motu musculari et spiritibus animalis),
he reasserted his view that nitro-aerial spirit played the major role in animal motions
although he concurred in general with Willis that muscular motion was caused by the
admixture of two different sorts of particles, in Mayow's case nitro-aerial particles
(usually but not always identified with the animal spirits) and saline sulphureous particles.
In a departure from his previous position, he asserted that the nitro-aerial particles came
into the muscle by means of the nerves and not the blood. Furthermore, he now believed,
following researches of Lower and Steno, that muscle volume did not increase during
contraction and hence could not be explained by inflation due to an explosion. Instead, he
suggested that heat given off by the movement of the nitro-aerial particles caused the
contraction of transverse fibrils of the muscle.34
These well-informed researches and speculations on the causes of muscle movement
formed the context of a conversation that took place between Newton and Boyle in the
spring of 1675, when the former visited London. In a letter of 14 December 1675 he asked
Oldenburg to thank Boyle for the discourse in London during which they had discussed
what Boyle had called Newton's "conceit of trapanning ye common Ether". The sense of
his reference to Boyle "entertain[ing]" this proposal "with a smile" is obscure, but the
topic of their talk clearly related to his project of accounting for the physiology of animal
motion, and he expressed his hope that when Boyle had "a set of expts to try in his air
pump, he will make that one to see how ye compression or relaxation of a muscle will
shrink or swell, soften or harden, lengthen or shorten it". Although this would have been
a more limited experiment involving the medium of air, Newton evidently hoped-to the
apparent amusement of Boyle-that there might be some experimental means of
manipulating the aether to see what effect this had on the muscle. The chemical notion of
"sociability" offered him a way to do this.35
It was possible that the soul had "an imediate power over the whole aether in any part
of the body to Swell or Shrink it at will", but this left unresolved the nature of the
dependency of muscular motion on the nerves. Alternatively, it could be done by means
of the soul acting upon the "aetheriall Spirit included within the Dura Mater", but "still
34 T Willis, Affectionum quae dicuntur hystericae Frank, op. cit., note 33 above, pp. 271-2. For a good
et hypochondriacae pathologia spasmodica vindicata account of the religious and social contexts of
contra responsionem epistolarem Nathanael Willis's "rational" neurophysiology, see R L
Highmore. M.D. Cui accesserunt exercitationes Martensen, "'Habit of Reason": anatomy and
medico-physicae duae. 1. De sanguinis accessione. Anglicanism in Restoration England', Bull. Hist.
2. De motu musculari, London, 1670, pp. 40-4; Med., 1992, 66: 511-35.
Mayow, Tractatus quinque medico-physici, Oxford, 35 Hall, et al. (eds), op. cit., note 17 above, vol. 1,
1674; Nayler, op. cit., note 33 above, pp. 419-34; p. 393.
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theres a difficulty why this force of the soule upon it does not take off the power of its
Springines whereby it should susteyne more or less the force ofthe Outward AEther". A
third possiblility was that the Soul could directly instill this spirit into any muscle by
means of the nerves, but this foundered on the difficulty of conceiving how the "tender
matter" ofthe brain could accomplish "a forcible intending the Spring ofthe aether in the
muscles by pressure". Drawing from his earlier researches on the optic nerve, he argued
that the spirit was so subtle on this assumption that there appeared to be no good reason
why it should not "go away through the Dura Mater & Skins ofthe muscle .. .".36
Instead, he now conceived of a number of "Animal Spirits ... of an aethereall Nature,
Subtile enough to pervade the Animaljuices as freely as the Electric or perhaps Magnetic
effluvia do glass". One might imagine how the "Coats of the braine, Nerves & muscles
may become a convenient vessell to hold so subtile a Spirit" by taking into account "how
liquors & Spirits are disposed topervade ornotpervade things on otheraccounts then their
Subtility". Some fluids, like oil and water, are prevented from mixing "by some secret
principle ofunsociablenes ... though their pores are in freedome enough to mix with one
another". This "unsociablenes" might exist in aetherial substances while possibly "the
reason, why Air stands rarer in the boxes of small Glass-pipes, & aether in the pores of
bodies, then elsewhere maybe, not wantofsubtlety, but Sociablenes". Ifthis were so, then
no matter how subtle the "aetheriall vital Spirit" was in man, it could be contained within
the "coats" of the brain nerves and muscles if it was "unsociable" to them though "very
Sociable to the marrow and Juices". Such a spirit could be sufficiently subtle "to pervade
readily the Animall juices, [and] as any of it is Spent", be "continually supplyed by new
Spirit from the heart".37
To make it suitable for animal motion, Newton brought to bear the phenomenon
whereby "some things unsociable are made Sociable by the Mediation ofa Third". Just as
any two substances were naturally unsociable to one another but could be made "sociable"
by the addition of yet another substance, so
in like manner the aethereal Animal Spirit in a man may be a mediator between the common aether
& the muscularjuices to make them mix more freely; & so by sending a litle ofthis Spirit into any
muscle, though so little as to cause no sensible tension of the muscle of its owne force, yet by
rendering the juices more Sociable to the common external aether, it may cause that aether to
pervade the muscle ofits owne accord in amoment more freely & copiously then itwould otherwise
do & to recede againe as freely so soon as this Mediator ofSociablenes is retracted.
To produce major motions in bodies, he supposed only that the "Spring" of the aether in
the muscle was extremely great so that even a little alteration in its density caused great
alteration in the pressure. Such a mechanism might also be the cause ofthe motions ofthe
heart, except that in this case the "Spirit" was "continually generated there by the
fermentation ofthe Juices [and] let out by starts into the braine through some convenient
ductus "38
For Newton, the production of the "Spirit" from this ferment was identical to the
creation of electrical attraction from a glass caused by rubbing, or the "burning out of
fewel to penetrate glasse, as Mr Boyle has showne, & calcine by corrosion Mettals melted
36 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 368. 38 Ibid.
37 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 368-9.
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therein". This highly original analysis of self-motion was also linked in the 'Hypothesis'
to the processes underlying the phenomenon oflight. That one should be wary ofoffering
simplistic mechanical explanations of light was evidenced by the fact of self-motion:
"God who gave Animals self motion beyond our understanding is without doubt able to
implant other principles ofmotion in bodies wch we may understand as little". The fact of
free will and the capacity for self-motion were always held by Newton as evidence that
the normal laws of motion had application over a limited domain. Self-motion remained
an undoubted phenomenon, whatever hypotheses were adduced for its explanation, and it
was even possible that the same cause operated in the vegetable and animal spheres as
worked to produce light. He concluded: "Some would readily grantthis may be aSpiritual
one; yet a mechanical one might be showne, did I not think it better to passe it by".39
In the draft 'Conclusio' to his 1687 Principia, he again returned to the researches ofthe
late 1660s on the structure of the optic nerve, but this time he rejected the use of animal
spirits in volitional motion. In the context of discussing "vibratory motion" which could
be "propagated in solids by the forces of even non-contiguous particles", he discussed
how the retina was agitated by light and "the remaining nerves by tangible objects ...
propagated to the sensorium through the solid and continuous capillamenta ofthe nerves".
In the other direction,
by a similar motion propagated from the sensorium through the solid capillamenta ofthe nerves, a
certain substance in the muscles can be agitated and by that agitation dilated so as to contract the
muscles and move the limbs. For the animal spirits (which they feign) can hardly be propagated
easily, swiftly and copiously enough through the compact substance of the nerves to swell the
muscles.40
People sweat when undergoing exertion, not because the movement of the muscles
gives rise to the inrush ofthese spirits, but because of "a certain agitation of the parts of
the body by which the muscles are kept distended, and when this ceases they grow
flaccid". In the Principia itself, there was a reference in the General Scholium of 1713 to
a"most subtle spirit" which
pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies [by which] electric bodies operate to greater distances, as
well repelling as attracting the neighbouring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reflected, refracted,
inflected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is excited, and the members ofanimal bodies move at
thecommand ofthe will, namely, by thevibrations ofthis spirit, mutually propagated alongthe solid
filaments of the nerves, from the outward organs of sense to the brain, and from the brain into the
muscles.
In the edition of 1713, the reader was to be disappointed in the expectation ofany further
analysis and Newton concluded that "these are things that cannot be concluded in a few
words, nor do we have at hand a sufficient number of experiments by which to
demonstrate & determine the laws ofaction ofthis spirit accurately, as ought to be done".
Nevertheless, in Motte's translation of 1729, the spirit (after consultation with Newton) is
called "electric and elastick", while "electrici & elastici" is to be found in Newton's hand
39 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 369-70. scientificpapers ofIsaac Newton, Cambridge
40 A R Hall and M B Hall (eds), The unpublished University Press, 1962, p. 346.
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in the margins of his own copy of the second edition of the Principia. The connection
between electricity and life did not emerge late on in the evolution of his natural
philosophy (as a number of commentators have suggested), and goes right back to his
experiments in the early 1670s and probably even earlier.41
4. In the Image ofGod: the Metaphysics ofSelf-motion
The experimental project on the body, and the factuality of spontaneous motion were
linked at the deepest level for Newton and they reappeared in a number of different
contexts. For example, Dobbs has recently questioned the dating of the untitled
manuscript which is now known by its first line "De Gravitatione et Aequipondio
Fluidorum", moving it from its previous home in the early 1670s to the period of the
Principia in the mid-1680s. If this is true, Newton's care in picking apart the allegedly
atheistic implications of the metaphysics of Descartes can be linked to the vehement
attack on the latter's vortices which made up a part of the second book of the Principia,
while he probably did not fully jettison his own belief in vortices until his work on De
motu corporum in the mid 1680s. De gravitatione may probably have been intended for
publication in the originally conceived Principia. In any case, as a number of pieces of
evidence attest, it was acrucially important document which was used again and again by
Newton in the rest ofhis career when he formulated relevant metaphysical positions.42
In De gravitatione, Newton attacked Descartes' identification of body with extension
as atheistic, and put forward a notion of space in which there were always a multitude of
figures not disclosed to sight. For Newton, these objects actually existed, although they
became visible only when God endowed them with sensible qualities (in the same way
that dye made visible swirling figures in water). After an analysis ofthe notion of space,
he considered the nature ofbody. He gave a voluntarist underpinning for the existence of
bodies, viz., that they existed by Divine Will, and proceeded to argue that the power of
God was such that he could have created bodies in an infinite number ofways. Neverthe-
less, we were not aware ofthe exact nature ofbodies and could only inferthis nature from
ourperceptions ofthem. Following this, he statedthathewouldinvestigate "acertain kind
ofbeing similar in every way to bodies, and whose creation we cannot deny to be within
the power ofGod, so that we can hardly say that it is not body".43
41 F Cajori (ed.), Sir Isaac Newton's mathematical Reidel, 1982, pp. 191-213, and idem, 'Force,
principles ofnaturalphilosophy and his system of electricity and the powers ofliving matter in
the world, 2 vols, London, University ofCalifornia Newton's mature philosophy ofnature', in M Osler
Press, 1931, vol. 2, p. 547. M B Hall and A R Hall, and P L Farber (eds), Religion, science and
'Newton's electric spirit: four oddities', Isis, 1959, worldview: essays in honorofRichardS. Westfall,
50:473-6, p. 474; A Koyre and I B Cohen, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 95-117.
'Newton's "Electric & Elastic Spirit"', Isis, 1960, 42 Dobbs, op. cit., note 30 above, pp. 139-49,
51:337. For other treatments ofNewton's renewed especially pp. 144 6. De gravitatione (CUL Add.
interest in the electric spirit, see J L Hawes, 'Newton Ms. 4003) is published in Hall and Hall, op. cit., note
and the "Electrical Attraction Unexcited"', Ann. Sci., 40 above, pp. 90-156.
1968, 24: 121-30; idem, 'Newton's two electricities', 43 Hall and Hall, op. cit., note 40 above, pp. 133,
Ann. Sci., 1971, 27: 95-103; R W Home, 'Newton 136-8. See also M Tamny, 'Newton, creation, and
on electricity and the aether', in Z Bechler (ed.), perception', Isis, 1979, 70: 48-59.
Contemporary Newtonian research, Dordrecht, D
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To get an idea ofGod's power, he considered the fact that all humans believed that they
could move their own bodies "at will", while they also believed that all men "enjoy the
same power of similarly moving their bodies by thought alone". This being so, God's
power of moving bodies by will could be understood as being of a similar kind of action
but infinitely greater and swifter; by "the sole act of thinking and willing" He could
"prevent a body from penetrating any space defined by certain limits". Any such space
made impervious to bodies would seem to be "truly body from the evidence ofour senses
(which constitute our sole judges in this matter)". If this "impenetrability" were
transported according to certain laws, then it would "have shape, be tangible and mobile"
and Newton did not see that it would "not equally operate upon our minds and in turn be
operated upon, because it is nothing more than the product ofthe divine mind realized in
a definite quantity of space". By definition, these sorts of bodies must be able to "excite
various perceptions ofthe senses andthefancy increated minds, andconverselybe moved
by them. . .". The only problem with this schema, then, lay in the precise manner in which
God imparted form to space. But this was reduced to the same problem ofhow we move
our own bodies, "and nevertheless we do believe that we can move them". If we knew
how we moved our own bodies, we might have some purchase on the largerproblem. This
was premissed on the analogy between God and man, and Newton argued thathis analysis
was designed to show that this analogy was much closer than previous Philosophers had
realized-"that we were created in God's image holy writ testifies"-and in order that
"God may appear (to our innermost consciousness) to have created the world solely by an
act of will alone".44
If body were simply extension, as Descartes claimed, then this led to atheism and an
unintelligible distinction between mind and body. Extension and thinking were not
separate substances, for otherwise we would have to say that mind had no extension and
so existed nowhere, and God would not "eminently contain extension within himselfand
thus [could] not create it". But in fact "ifextension is eminently contained in God, or the
highest thinking being ... both may fit the same created substance". The sense organs of
humans were implicit in the definition of body, and Newton claimed that Descartes was
wrong in his belief that extension remained after all non-essential items like gravity,
hardness and sensible qualities had been removed from the notion ofbody:
For we may also reject that faculty or power by which [the sensible qualities] stimulate the
perceptions ofthinking beings. For since there is so great a distinction between the ideas ofthinking
and of extension that it is impossible that there should be any basis of connection or relation
[between them] except that which is caused by divine power, the above faculty of bodies can be
rejected without violating extension, but not without violating their corporeal nature.
It was not a question of an actual union of mind and body, since there were a number of
bodies which were not united to minds, but concerned
44 Hall and Hall, op. cit., note 40 above, pp. perfection, & to that extent God [can] be discerned in
138-41. In a slightly later manuscript he wrote that the more perfect creatures as in a mirror . . ."; cf. J E
creatures shared "so far as possible the attributes of McGuire, 'Newton on space, time and God: an
God (as fruit the nature ofthe tree and an image the unpublished source', Br. J. Hist. Sci., 1978, 11:
likeness ofman), and by sharing tend towards 115-28, p. 123.
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a faculty in bodies by which they are capable ofa union through the forces ofnature. From the fact
that the parts of the brain, especially the more subtle ones to which the mind is united, are in a
continual flux, new ones succeeding to those which fly away, it is manifest that that faculty is
present in all bodies.
This was not the final time that he deployed his work on self-motion in a different sphere.
Although he continued to think about the union between soul and body and the physical
causes of spontaneous motion, the research was made public only in an attenuated form
in the Queries of the Opticks and as an empirical fact which pointed both to the
shortcomings of a purely mechanical philosophy and to laws other than those expressed
in the Principia.4s
5. Active Principles and the Mechanical Threat
The practical investigation of the related powers of the will and of the imagination
remained ofprime importance for Newton throughout the rest ofhis life. Notoriously, he
vacillated between attributing events in nature to the direct volitional power ofGod, and
to secondary instruments such as "active principles" responsible for various phenomena
such as biological and mineral growth. The power of self-motion was a third possibility
which was sometimes separated from active principles, and sometimes accounted by him
as an example ofthem. In the three major editions ofhis Opticks (1704, 1706 (the Optice)
and 1717/18), he progressively inserted material on the reality of an all-pervasive aether,
and the third and final set of Queries were those that most vigorously asserted its
existence. But in the earlier Query 28, Newton followed the conjunction outlined in an
earlier manuscript from the 1690s in which he had asserted that God "decre[ed] and
rule[d] all things by means of his substantial presence (as the thinking part of a man
perceives the appearances ofthings brought into thebrain and thence rules its own body)":
How do the Motions ofthe Body follow from the Will, and whence is the instinct in animals? Is not
the Sensory ofAnimals that place to which the insensitive substance is present, and into which the
sensible Species ofThings are carried through the Nerves and Brain, that they may be perceived by
their immediate presence to that Substance? And these things rightly dispatch'd, does it not appear
from Phaenomena that there is a Being incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent, who in infinite
Space, as it were his Sensory, sees the things intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and
comprehends them wholly by their immediate presence to himself ... .?46
This passage recalled his early researches, but was now linked to the programme of
work on active principles which postdated the Principia of 1687. It had definitively
covered the macroscopic laws determining gravity and force but there were a number of
45 Hall and Hall, op. cit., note 40 above, pp. 143, Sci., 1986, 24: pp. 335-81, and for the role of active
145-6. For the general problem ofthe relation principles in Newton's explanation ofgravity, see
between mind and matter in this period, see J Yolton, idem, "'Pray do not ascribe that notion to me": God
Thinking matter: materialism in eighteenth century and Newton's gravity', in J E Force and R H Popkin
Britain, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, (eds), The books ofnature andscripture: recent
1983. essays on naturalphilosophy, theology, and Biblical
46 For the relatively common use of active criticism in the Netherlands ofSpinoza's time and the
principles in this period, see J Henry, 'Occult British Isles ofNewton's time, London, Kluwer
qualities and the experimental philosophy: active Academic Publishers, 1994, pp. 123-48.
principles in pre-Newtonian matter theory', Hist.
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other areas such as magnetism to which the tools ofthe Principia could not be applied. In
a passage which was intended for the Optice, Newton related the conservation offorce by
means ofactive principles to the visible decline ofmotion in the world: "Seeing therefore
the variety of motion (wch we see) in the world is always decreasing, there is a necessity
of conserving and recruiting it by active principles; such as are (the power of life & Will
by which animals move their bodies with great and lasting force)". He added that "we
meet with very little motion on the world besides what is (visibly) owing to these active
principles, & the power ofthe will".47
This power was again linked closely to the positivistic stance adopted in Principia (in
which Newton presumed to avoid disputes about causation and ontology by talking only
of "phaenomena"), as well as to the new interest in active principles which had become
the focus ofinterest in the Opticks. Another passage illustrates this well. Here he used the
mysterious nature of the power of self-movement to assert that one could argue from the
phenomenon of self-movement to the existence of active principles without the aid of
"metaphysical arguments [which] are very slippery ... We find in orselves a power of
moving our bodies by Or thoughts (but the laws of this power we do not know) & see ye
same power in other living creatures but how this is done & by what laws we do not
know". From this example "& that ofgravity it appears that there are other laws ofmotion
(unknown to us) than those wch arise from Vis inertiae (unknown to us) wch is enough to
justify & encourage Or search after them. We cannot say that all nature is not alive". In
other drafts from c. 1705, he stated that "Life & Will (thinking) are active Principles by
wch we move ourbodies, & thence arise other laws ofmotion unknown to us", concluding
elsewhere that ifthere was
an universal life and all space be the sensorium of a immaterial thinking being, who by immediate
presence perceives things in it as thatwch thinks in us perceives theirpictures in thebrain and whose
Ideas work more powerfully upon matter than the Imagination of a mother works upon an embrio,
orthat ofa man upon his body forpromoting health or sickness, the laws ofmotion arising from life
or will may be ofuniversal extent.48
His public pronouncements on both the operation and methodological function of
Divine or merely human will were kept to a minimum. In a Query (number 23) added to
his Optice of 1706, he argued that we came across very little motion in the world except
what was due to active principles or the Divine Will, although in the corresponding Query
(number 31) in the Opticks of 1717/18, the reference to the Divine Fiat had disappeared.
From 1704 he had directed Francis Hauksbee on a series of researches on electricity and
47 J E McGuire, 'Force, active principles and prepared by ferment & the ferment is taken from
Newton's invisible realm', Ambix, 1968, 15: animals ofthe same kind, & makes the nourishment
154-208, pp. 169-70 (from CUL Add. Ms. 3970 fols subtile & spiritual. In adult animals the nourishm' is
255r-256r). fermented by the choler and pancreatic juice both
48 Ibid., pp. 171, 205 and 196 (passages from CUL wch come from the blood." This passage occurs
Add. Ms. 3970 fols 620r, 619r, 244w and 252'). amongst the drafts for one ofthe Queries to the
Newton was a preformationist who held that the Opticks at CUL Add. Ms. 3970 fol. 235r. For
embryo of the young is already present in the egg; extended material on the heart, see ibid., fol. 652r.
"by the act ofgeneration nothing more is done than See also P D Bowler, "'Preformation" and pre-
to ferment the sperm of the female by ye sperm of ye existence in the seventeenth century: a brief
male that it may thereby become fit nourishment for analysis', J. Hist. Bio., 1971, 4: 221-44.
ye Embriyo. fforye nourishment of all animals is
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he turned to this as the best candidate for accounting for the principles and forces which
were not covered by the Principia. In a draft Query 25 which was to have appeared in the
1717/18 Opticks, Newton saw the "very subtile, but active, potent, electric spirit" asjust
this mysterious and ubiquitous force:
vibrations may be excited in the bottom of the eye by light & propagated thence through the solid
capillamenta of the Optick Nerves into the sensorium for causing vision & the like of other senses
The like vibrations may be also propagated from the brain through the solid fibres of the spinal
marrow & its branches into ye muscles for agitating & expanding ye liquors therein & thereby
contracting the muscles to cause ye motions of animals. For liquors are expanded by heat & by
consequence by the vibrating agitations of the spirit. If the agitations be of short continuance they
expand the liquors without heating them. If lasting (as in running a race, or in supporting a burden
without external motion of the body) they heat the body by degrees & at length excite sweat. This
spirit therefore may be the medium of sense of animal motion & by consequence of uniting the
thinking soul & unthinking body.49
His manuscript corpus contains a number of detailed statements about the possible
causes of self-motion and this apparently irreducible power came to be of central
importance in his fight with Leibniz. The latter had accused any nonmechanical
explanations ofphenomena like gravity as being either occult (such as Newton's concept
of gravitational attraction) or miraculous, and had asserted (on the basis of a rare print of
the Optice which Newton had done his best to suppress) that the Newtonian philosophy
held that space was literally the sensorium of God. After a supposedly impartial
committee ofthe Royal Society had decided in favour ofNewton's right to priority in the
invention ofthe calculus, he had a group ofletters relating to the affairpublished in aform
known as the 'Commercium Epistolicum'. In a letter to the Abbe Conti of 26 February
1716 he complained that Leibniz had not responded to this publication, and he replied to
the metaphysical issues that were then being debated elsewhere in the correspondence
which was nominally between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke. Leibniz, he wrote, "colludes
in the significations ofwords, calling those things miracles wch create no wonder & those
things occult qualities whose causes are occult tho the qualities themselves be manifest,
& those things the souls ofmen wch do not animate their bodies". His main target was the
Leibnizian doctrine of Harmonia Praestabilita which he condemned as miraculous and
which he damned ascontradicting "thedailyexperience ofall mankind, every man finding
in himself a power ofseeing with his eyes & moving his body by his will".50
Clarke's public response to his patron's main enemy was in part the result of much
background work by Newton, visible in a tortuous series of drafts of letters to Conti. In
these Newton criticized his opponent's lack of empirical evidence for his own doctrine:
"He pleads for Hypothetical Philosophy because there may happen experiments to decide
wch of the Hypoteses are true, & yet almost all his Philosophy consists in Metaphysical
Hypoteses such as never were and nevercan be decidedby experiments . . .". ForNewton,
Leibniz's notion of God as an Intelligentia Supramundana was supposedly based on his
49 CUL Add. Ms. 3970 fol. 241rV and 244r. 50 Newton to Conti, in Hall, et al., op. cit., note 17
Compare with Optice, p. 343: "Nam admodum above, vol. 6, p. 285.
paullum Motus in mundo invenimus praeterquam
quod vel ex his Principiis actuosis, vel ex imperio
Voluntatis, manifesto oritur."
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desire to avoid a God who was the soul ofthe world, "and yet according to his Philosophy
(that of Harmonia Praestabilita) the soul of man doth not animate his body". Moreover,
Leibniz called the world God's watch, "& insinuates that it is the fault ofthe workman &
not ofthe materials ifa watch will at length cease to go, & in like mannerthat it would be
God's fault ifhis watch should ever decay and want an amendment". By the same way of
arguing, Newton continued, "a man may say that it would be God's fault ifmatterdoth not
think". Leibniz's scheme left a literally Godless creation, a notion that explicitly
contravened Scripture and, according to Newton, Leibniz was angry at him "for saying
that God is everywhere & that he is not far from everyone of us; for in him we live and
move & have our being". In his correspondence with Leibniz, Samuel Clarke adopted
identical positions to those ofNewton.51
Clarke's response to Leibniz's first letterbegan with a statement ofthe Newtonian party
line on the status of space and its relation to God, linking this "by similitude" to the way
in which "the mind ofman" sees images "as ifthey were the things themselves". Later, he
argued that by "sensorium" Newton meant theplace ofsensation rather than the organs of
sense themselves, while the soul in man was not present to all parts of the body but
operated only "upon the brain, or certain nerves and spirits, which, by laws and
communications of God's appointing, influence the whole body". In the more substantial
two final letters to Leibniz, Clarke trotted out his master's opinion on the miraculous or
deterministic nature of the mind-body system in Leibniz's scheme and lashed his
opponent's system as "wholly taking away the very idea of liberty". Like God, humans
remained active beings with their own principle of action, even when faced by two
apparently indistinguishable choices.52
In the final letter, Clarke made clear the restrictive political and religious consequences
of Leibniz's position and stressed the connection between the notion of free will and the
responsible individual: "the true and only question in philosophy concerning liberty is,
whether the immediate physical cause or principle of action be indeed in him whom we
call the agent". On the other hand, Leibniz's philosophy "tends to make men be thought
of as mere machines, as Descartes imagined beasts to be", and crucially, "by taking away
all arguments drawn from phenomena, that is, from the actions of men, to prove there is
any soul, or any thing more than mere matter in at all". If preestablished harmony were
true, then "a man does not indeed see, norhear, nor feel any thing, nor move his body, but
only dreams that he sees, and hears, and feels, and moves his body".53
5. The Theological Politics ofSelf
In the England ofthe mid 171Os, liberty was a crucial political and philosophical issue.
In the light of the forthcoming appearance of a new post-Stuart regime, Clarke worked
hard to curry favour with the House ofHanover and to let people know that the doctrines
51 CUL Add. Ms. 3968 fols. 591, 589, 587r, 571w 52 H G Alexander (ed.), The Leibniz-Clarke
and 436v, cited in A Koyre and I B Cohen, 'Newton correspondence, Manchester, 1965, pp. 13, 21, 34,
and the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence with notes on 51, 98.
Newton, Conti and Des Maizeaux', Archives s3 Ibid., pp. 99, 110, 116.
internationales d'histoire des sciences, 1962, 15:
63-126, pp. 73, 74, 114 and 109.
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of the new King's resident Court philosopher were no better than that ofthe freethinkers
and deists. In this context, the correspondence with Leibniz on the nature of liberty,
divinity and kingship was ofthe utmost significance. In the face ofrenewed threats from
the Pretender, a number of Whigs had moved closer to the court in their bid to stabilize
the Hanoverian succession, and Steven Shapin has pointed outthatthe immediate political
setting for Clarke's work was the rejection of traditional Whig views of a monarchy
limited by law in favour ofa more absolutist ruler who reigned by fiat. In addition to this,
the recent experiences of William Whiston and Clarke, who had both been hounded for
their antitrinitarian beliefs, meant that there was a great need fornatural philosophers who
were Court Whigs to prove that Newtonian theology was orthodox.54
The related issue of whether thought could be an essential property of matter-or had
necessarily to be superadded to it by God-had come to the fore with the publication of
John Locke's Essay concerning human understanding in the early 1690s, and was directly
addressed (in a series of arguments which owed much to Newton) by Richard Bentley in
his second Boyle Lecture (Matter and motion cannot think) of 1692. In his own Boyle
Lectures of 1704-5, Clarke stressed the unbounded nature ofGod's will and attacked the
notion that matter might have a principle of self-motion within itself. Only ifactivity was
superadded to brute matter could God's power and the immortality of the soul be
guaranteed; without freedom of the will, there was no such thing as moral responsibility
and a society premised on such a deterministic view ofman was doomed to collapse into
anarchy. Although the requirements of different contexts coloured the precise way in
which Clarke defended human, monarchical and Divine will, the extent of legitimate use
of will which he accorded to these beings was highly unusual for a Whig thinker in the
first decade ofthe eighteenth century. Despite the relative stability ofhis position between
1704 and 1716, it is correct to point out that Clarke's specific accounts of the domain of
will were fashioned for local contexts. Yet although it may not be true that Newton wrote
Clarke's side of the correspondence, this paper has pointed to what was perhaps a highly
significant source of Clarke's writings.55
Almost the earliest work we have from the Newtonian corpus indicates how he tore
pneumatological and physiological information from what he called "The excellent Dr
Moore['s] booke of ye soules immortality" to begin his project on the power of the
imagination and the operation of the soul. This programme was summed up by his
Aristotelian conviction that one could not begin to grasp how much in an act of
54 See in particular S Shapin, 'Of gods and kings: conceptions of mind and body, see A Suzuki, 'Anti-
natural philosophy and politics in the Leibniz-Clarke Lockean enlightenment? Mind and body in early
disputes', Isis, 1981, 72: 187-215, especially pp. eighteenth- century English medicine', in R Porter
201, 204-10; N Jolley, 'Leibniz on Locke and (ed.), Medicine in the Enlightenment, Amsterdam,
Socinianism', J. Hist. Ideas, 1978, 39: 233-50, and Rodopi, 1995, pp. 336-59. Locke uses exactly the
Yolton, op. cit., note 44 above, pp. 10-20, 29-39. same general argument as Newton regarding the
55 Shapin, op. cit., note 54 above, pp. 193, 210-11, relevance of understanding the physiology of self-
213-14, and Yolton, op. cit. note 45 above, pp. motion to comprehending Creation; see Essay, Bk
38-43. For Clarke on freedom see J H Gay, 'Matter IV, ch. 10, sect. 19. As Martin Tamny has pointed
and freedom in the thought of Samuel Clarke', J. out, the French translator of Locke's Essay, Pierre
Hist. Ideas, 1963, 24: 85-105. For 'Locke's Coste, revealed after Newton's death that Newton
suggestion', see Yolton, op. cit., note 45 above, pp. himself had confessed to suggesting this argument to
14-28. For eighteenth-century reactions to Lockean Locke; see Tamny, op. cit., note 43 above, pp. 48-9.
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sensation-our only means ofgaining knowledge about the outside world-derives from
the soul or body unless one had a well-grounded understanding of their functions and
operations. It was an experimental project which drew from a number ofdifferent tools in
his intellectual armoury, which spanned the whole ofhis career, and which was expressed
publicly as a conviction that self-movement proved both the reality ofindividual freewill
and that there was more to comprehending the world than was demonstrated in the
Principia. At stake was something which mighthave completed Newton's overall concern
with uncovering the laws of nature through natural philosophy, and which by analogy
would have pointed to an understanding of how God created and then existed with His
world. Nevertheless, the fact that this medically-derived project was based on a series of
private experimental researches which sought to explicate the mind-body relationship
remained largely unknown to his contemporaries. Ironically, his rich physiological
material could not fully be deployed by the physicians and philosophers who went on in
the period following the publication of the Principia to use Newton's doctrines and
authority to construct a "Newtonian" physiology.56
56 McGuire and Tamny, op. cit., note 19 above, p.
340. Drawing from the reflections in the Queries of
Newton's Opticks, George Cheyne, John Keill,
William Derham and Henry Pemberton all developed
theories of the physiology of self-motion in
Newton's lifetime; for a good account ofthis see
Yolton, op. cit., note 45 above, pp. 162-6. For the
general medical use by physicians ofthe Principia
and ofother Newton material, see T M Brown,
'Medicine in the shadow ofthe Principia', J. Hist.
Ideas, 1987, 48: 629-48, A Cunningham, 'Sydenham
versus Newton: the Edinburgh fever dispute of the
1690s between Andrew Browne and Archibald
Pitcaime', in W F Bynum and V Nutton (eds),
Theories offeverfrom antiquity to the
Enlightenment, London, Wellcome Institute for the
History ofMedicine, 1981, Med. Hist., Supplement
no. 1, and the following articles by Anita Guerrini:
'James Keill, George Cheyne and Newtonian
physiology, 1690-1740', J. Hist. Biol., 1985, 18:
247-66; 'The Tory Newtonians: Gregory, Pitcaime
and their circle', J. Brit. Studs., 1986, 25: 288-311,
and 'Archibald Pitcaime and Newtonian medicine',
Med. Hist., 1987, 31: 70-83.
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